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I. INTRODUCTION
Allow me first to say what an honor it is to be invited to present Duke’s first
Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture. Herbert’s death at the Law School a
little more than a year ago was a great shock not only to the Duke Law
School community but also to the many friends he had in Germany. I knew
him for nearly 40 years, and I am very grateful indeed for this opportunity
to pay tribute to him and his contribution to the law and legal education.
When Dean Bartlett agreed to the topic of my lecture she must have
realised that letting a foreign lawyer touch upon American civil
procedure would be a hazardous affair. Not only is a foreign lawyer who
ventures into this field bound sooner or later to fall into error, but also he
will expect you to forgive him and kindly put him right when he does so.
Not only is he apt to rush in where local angels fear to tread, but also
courtesy may require you to call his views original and refreshing when
they are heretical or bizarre. There is one countervailing argument
supporting the choice of my subject, however, and that is that it was very
dear to Herbert’s heart. He and I discussed it on many occasions, and
while we both felt that comparing the machinery of civil justice in the
common law and the civil law was a most challenging and interesting
undertaking, we also agreed that it was a subject fraught with greater
risks of fundamental misunderstanding of foreign law than those which
beset the comparative endeavours in substantive law.1

* First Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke
University School of Law, Sept. 10, 2002. Reprinted with permission from The Duke Journal
of Comparative and International Law: CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES, 13 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2003).
** Emeritus Director, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law,
former president of the Bucerius Law School. Professor Kötz delivered the inaugural Herbert
L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture on September 10, 2002, at Duke University School of Law. A
friend and colleague of Professor Bernstein, Professor Kötz is co-author of Konrad Zweigert
& Hein Kötz, Introduction To Comparative Law (3rd ed. transl. Tony Weir 1998).
1. Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison
of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U. Cal. Davis 587 (1988).
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Our shared interest in the comparison of civil justice systems goes
back to the early 1960s when both Herbert and I were graduate students
at the University of Michigan Law School. All graduate students with a
European Law background were given an introductory course on
American Law. Procedure was an important subject of this course, and
adversariness was held up to us as the hallmark of the American proce‐
dural system. The introductory course itself followed the adversary
model in that we were asked to read Roscoe Pound’s celebrated article,
“Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,”
with its sharp attack on the excesses of the adversary system.2 We were
told that Jerome Frank had described the American mode of trials as
being based on what he called the “fight theory”, a theory which in his
view “derives from the origin of trials as substitutes for private out‐of‐
court brawls” and “frequently…blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or
leads to a presentation of vital testimony in a way that distorts it.”3 At the
time, however, this had no great impact on us. We were enthralled to
watch lawyer‐dominated civil and criminal trials at the Ann Arbour
Circuit Court on closed‐circuit television in a viewing room at the law
school. We also enjoyed the moot court cases with their colourful and
dramatic confrontation between partisan student advocates, and any
lingering doubts about the attractions of adversariness were dispelled by
reading Earl Stanley Gardner, Raymond Chandler and Robert Traver’s
novel entitled Anatomy of a Murder.4
For those of us who remained in contact with American law,
however, a gradual process of disenchantment set in. Like most readers
of Robert Traver’s novel we were delighted by the defendant’s acquittal
on the basis of a successful plea of impaired mental capacity. But the not‐
guilty verdict was based on facts supplied by the defendant only after his
lawyer had impressed upon him what type of fact would constitute that
defence. Can it be right to allow or even require a lawyer to arm his client
for effective perjury? There were other questions we asked. It is all very
well to say that cross‐examination is, in the words of John Wigmore, “the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” and that it
is a most effective weapon to test dishonest witnesses and ferret out the
truth.5 But isn’t it a weapon equally lethal to heroes and villains? There is
no doubt that all procedural systems aim at an intelligent inquiry into all

2. Roscoe Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
40 Am. L. Rev. 729 (1906).
3. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality, in American Justice 80–90
(1949).
4. Robert Traver, Anatomy of a Murder (1958).
5. John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1387, at 29 (3d ed. 1940).
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the practically available evidence in order to ascertain, as near as may be,
the truth about the facts. But suppose a businessman were to decide
whether or not to build a new plant: Would he think of obtaining the
needed information by subjecting his informants to the experience of
standing as a witness at a common law trial? Is there no more businesslike
method to unearth the relevant facts?
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN GERMANY
It is indeed a routine business meeting an American lawyer will believe
he is attending when he is led into a German courtroom.6 What is most
likely to strike him is the fact that mainly the court conducts the
interrogation of witnesses.7 It is the court that will ask for the witness’s
name, age, occupation, and residence.8 It is the court that will then invite
the witness to narrate, without undue interruption, what he knows about
the matter on which he has been called. After the witness has given his
story in his or her own words the court will ask questions designed to
test, clarify, and amplify it. It is then the turn of counsel for the parties to
formulate pertinent questions. But in an ordinary case there is relatively
little questioning by counsel for the parties, at least by common law
standards. One reason is that the judge will normally have covered the
ground. Another reason is that for counsel to examine at length after the
court seemingly has exhausted the witness might appear to imply that
the court does not know its business, which is a dubious tactic. There is
no cross‐examination in the sense of the common law, nor is there a full
stenographic transcript of the testimony. Instead, the judge himself
pauses from time to time to dictate a summary of what the witness has
said so far.9 At the close of testimony the clerk will read back the dictated
summary in full, and either witness or counsel may suggest improve‐

6. For more detailed information in English on the German civil justice system, see the
seminal study by Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of
German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1443 (1958), now over 40 years
old but fundamentally accurate. Comparative articles based on this study are Benjamin
Kaplan, Civil Procedure – Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409
(1960); William B. Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 Hastings
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 221 (1983); Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on
First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal
Rules, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 609 (1988). See also David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial
Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 Am. J.
Comp. L. 745, 748–69 (1986).
7. Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German
Civil Procedure in The Nineties, 13 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 25, 43 (1998).
8. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1234–35.
9. John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823,
828 (1985) [hereinafter German Advantage].
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ments in the wording. If the exact phrasing of a particular part of the
testimony is believed to be of critical importance, counsel may insist on
having it set down verbatim in the minutes.
A similar system is used with respect to expert witnesses. Suppose a
case requires an expert’s evidence, for example an action for damages
brought by a patient against his physician on the ground of the
defendant’s failure to use ordinary care in his treatment. In Germany, as
indeed in most Continental countries, the expert will be selected and
appointed by the court after consultation with the parties.10 It is the court
that will conduct his examination, and it is the court that will advance the
expert’s fees eventually to be borne by the losing party.11 In the common
law it is up to the parties, or rather their lawyers, to find suitable experts
who will then be examined and cross‐examined in the same way as
ordinary witnesses. I have served both as a court‐appointed expert on
foreign law in cases pending before a German court, and as party‐
selected expert witness on German law in litigation before the High Court
in London, and I assure you that there are substantial differences
between the two roles. As a court‐appointed expert you are an ally and
partner of the court. You assist the court to the best of your ability in
reaching a correct result, and it is with the court that your duty of loyalty
lies. What struck me most in my role as party‐selected expert witness in
the English cases was not the experience of being examined and cross‐
examined, but the difficulty to resist the subtle temptation to join your
client’s team, to take your client’s side, to conceal doubts, to overstate the
strong and downplay the weak aspects of his case and to dampen any
scruples you might have by reminding yourself that the other side will
select and instruct another expert witness and that, when the dust has
settled, the truth will triumph.
The examination of witnesses in the Continental style may not be
free from certain risks. One might say, for example, that the technique of
inviting the witness to tell his story in narrative form and without undue
interruption provides an incentive, in the interest of presenting a
conclusive, logically coherent, and convincing story, to fill in gaps by half‐
truths or fiction. There is also a danger that the judge, in acting as chief‐
examiner of the witnesses, may sooner or later appear to favour one side
over the other. By putting questions to the witness, in the words of Lord
Denning, he “drops the mantle of the judge, and assumes the robe of an
10. Id. at 835–41.
11. For a detailed and accurate description of the process of selecting, instructing and
examining experts in Germany, see id. Much of what follows on the characteristic features of
German civil procedure is based on this brilliant article. See also Bohlander, supra note 7, at
41–43.
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advocate.”12 In general, however, a competent judge in questioning
witnesses knows how to play his cards close to his chest. If he pursued
one line of questioning with undue vigour or in some other way revealed
his evaluation of the testimony this would at any rate have no influence
on a jury as the sole trier of facts because there are no civil juries on the
Continent, nor any even in the United Kingdom. As to counsel, they may
ask follow‐up questions as an antidote against unfair or incompetent
questioning by the judge.13
On the other hand, under the Continental system there is no need,
as in common law jurisdictions, to prepare the prospective witness for
counsel’s questions during the examination‐in‐chief and cross‐
examination.14 Consequently, the “coaching” or “sandpapering” of
witnesses is not a problem. Indeed, German lawyers will generally be
reluctant to engage in extensive out‐of‐court contact with prospective
witnesses.15 A canon of professional ethics promulgated by the German
Bar Association in 1973 provided that out‐of‐court contact with
witnesses was advisable only when special circumstances justified it and
was at any rate limited to clarifying what the witness would be able to
say.16 This rule was dropped when new provisions on professional ethics
were enacted in 1996, probably because there seemed no need for it.17
After all, it is fairly clear to an attorney that the judge would take a dim
view of the reliability of a witness who previously had been closeted for
long periods with counsel.
Civil procedure in Germany and in other civil law jurisdictions
differs from the American system by making the judge responsible for
the selection of expert witnesses, for the examination‐in‐chief of both fact
12. Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 Q.B. 55, 63.
13. Bohlander, supra note 7, at 43.
14. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835–37.
15. Kaplan, von Mehren, Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1200–01.
16. Section 6, entitled Questioning and Advising of Witnesses, provides as follows: (1)
The lawyer may question persons out of court who might be considered witnesses if this is
necessary with a view to the obligation to provide for clarification of facts, advice or
representation. (2) The lawyer may inform these persons as regards their rights and duties as
well as give advice to them. (3) The lawyer is allowed to establish a record of such
questioning and to have the person sign a declaration. Such a record may be used by the
lawyer in order to confront the witness with these statements in a judicial or administrative
proceeding. However, the lawyer may present the record itself only in exceptional cases to
the court or the administrative agency, for example, in those cases where the witness is
unable to testify in the pre-trial discovery stage or during the proceedings. [. . .] (5) In any
event, the appearance of undue influence is to be avoided. Grundsaetze Des Anwaltlichen
Standesrechts, Hrichtlinien Gemaess § 177 Absatz 2 Nr. 2 Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung
(Brao).
17. See new provisions of Brao available at http://jurcom5juris.de/bundsrecht/
brao/index.html.
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and expert witnesses, and for creating the record based on those
examinations.18 The judge’s conspicuous role in the actual taking of
evidence, especially in the taking of witness testimony, has led common
lawyers to label Continental civil procedure as “inquisitorial” or “non‐
adversarial”. This is misleading because it conjures up the Spanish
Inquisition, Kafka’s Castle, and bureaucratic omnipotence and has indeed
led an English judge to say, in comparing English and Continental proce‐
dure, that “our national experience found that justice is more likely to
ensue from adversary than from inquisitorial procedures – Inquisition
and Star Chamber were decisive, and knowledge of recent totalitarian
methods has merely rammed the lesson home.”19 In my view, however,
this is not only misleading, but also downright wrong. All arguments
generally praising the virtues of the adversarial system of the common
law and contrasting them with the vices of the inquisitorial system
ascribed to the civil law are misguided and, in Herbert Bernstein’s words,
“cannot advance, even by an inch, the comparative analysis of German
and American civil procedure.”20
The truth is that both in the American and Continental civil justice
systems, the power to establish the facts on which the judicial decision
rests is reserved to the decision‐makers, whether the trial judge or jury
in the United States, or the court on the Continent.21 On the other hand, it
is in both systems exclusively for the parties and their lawyers to identify
the facts they think will support the claim or defence, to make the
appropriate factual allegations, and to nominate the witnesses and the
facts of which they allegedly have knowledge. In the United States, just as
on the Continent, the civil courts must work with what they are given,
and they must establish the factual basis of their judgments from the
materials the parties supply, and no others. Facts not in dispute between
the parties are beyond judicial scrutiny, nor can the judge do anything
about a fact alleged by one party and not specifically challenged by the
opponent. He must take that fact as established and if he believes that the
facts presented by the parties are not true he has no power to unearth
what he thinks might be the truth by introducing independent evidence.
True, this does not apply to criminal procedure. In a criminal case the
Continental judge may disregard the defendant’s guilty plea or a
confession or admission and introduce independent evidence, including
witness testimony, to determine what is called the “material truth”
18.
19.
231.
20.
21.

Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835–36.
D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1978] A.C. 171,
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 589–90.
von Mehren, supra note 21, at 609.
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(materielle Wahrheit). In civil matters, however, the principle of “formal
truth” (formelle Wahrheit) applies. “Formal truth” is what the court, to
the best of its ability, believes to be true having regard to the evidence
placed before it by the parties. The court’s task is to do, and be seen to be
doing, justice between the parties; it is not to ascertain some inde‐
pendent truth. It often happens, from the imperfection of evidence, or the
withholding of it, sometimes by the party in whose favour it would tell if
presented, that an adjudication has to be made which is not, and is
known not to be, the whole truth of the matter. Yet provided the decision
has been in accordance with the available evidence and with the law,
justice will have been fairly done.
It follows that in their own ways both the German and American
systems are adversary systems of civil procedure.22 In both systems the
lawyers advance partisan positions from first pleadings to final argu‐
ments. In both systems the parties and their lawyers investigate and
identify in their briefs the facts they think will support their claims and
defences. In both systems the court cannot go beyond the parties’ factual
contentions nor can the court strike out on its own in the search for what
it believes might be the real truth.
III. PROCEDURAL CONTRASTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
To be sure, quite a few features of German civil procedure are in marked
contrast to American practises. First there is the judge’s prominent role
in the actual taking of witness testimony.23 This should not be overrated,
however, because the judge, even though he serves as the examiner‐in‐
chief of the witnesses, is prohibited from inducing them to testify on facts
other than those for which they were named. Another characteristic of
German and indeed Continental civil procedure is that no party is
allowed to call as many witnesses as he pleases. There is no rule requir‐
ing all of plaintiff’s witnesses to be heard before the defendant’s
witnesses, nor is there a compulsion to take proof on all the apparently
contested issues at one sitting or to call first the witnesses nominated by
the party carrying the burden of proof.
What the parties can do and will do is to nominate witnesses in
support of specific factual allegations.24 It is then for the court to make an
evidentiary order identifying the witnesses to be heard, describing with

22. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 841–48.
23. Id. at 832–35.
24. Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Kock, Kurt Riecherberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea For More Details and Fewer Generalities in
Comparative Scholarship, 32 NW. U. L. Rev. 705, 720–21 (1988).
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some precision the facts on which each witness is to be examined and
fixing the order in which they are to be called. In making this evidentiary
order the court will consult with the parties who will direct the court’s
attention to particularly cogent lines of inquiry. However, the final
decision rests with the court whose discretion will be guided by a strict
standard of relevance as well as by the principle that evidence is to be
taken only to the extent and in the order most likely to result in a speedy
disposal of the case.
If, for example, witnesses have been nominated for a factual
contention, which the judge believes on legal grounds to be immaterial to
the party’s claim or defence, he will not allow the witness to be called.
Nor will he order the examination of a witness in support of a factual
allegation, which the judge finds is not really in dispute between the
parties or which has not been specifically challenged by the opposition. If
the court perceives that there is a matter that is likely to be determi‐
native, it may confine the evidentiary order to that matter and await the
results before issuing a further evidentiary order. Suppose that in a
seller’s action for the price the buyer’s defence is, first, that no contract
was formed; second, that the goods delivered were defective; and, third,
that in any event the seller’s claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
In this situation it is within the judge’s discretion to select the defence
most likely to lead to a dismissal of the action, and to postpone consider‐
ation of the other defences.
In a brilliant, if controversial, article John Langbein characterized
the German procedural system as one in which the gathering of the facts
was entrusted to, and controlled by, the judge.25 In his view, judicially
dominated fact‐gathering is the hallmark of the German system and
constitutes the major “German advantage” as compared with the system
prevailing in the United States. I am not sure whether it is wholly
appropriate to describe the court’s job as that of “gathering the facts”.
After all, it is the parties and their lawyers who will investigate the facts,
discuss them with their clients, select what will be presented to the court,
indicate means of proof, and thus “gather” the factual materials with
which the court must work.26 This is why the German system is an
adversarial system. However, once the parties have supplied the factual
materials and the time has come to investigate the truth of the parties’
allegations, evaluate the evidence, and find the facts on which the
decision is to be based, the German judge has fairly strong control over

25. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9.
26. Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 24 at 722–26.
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the procedure.27 He may disregard proof offers, which, according to strict
criteria of relevance, might safely be overlooked. Nor are there any
binding rules on sequence, such as “plaintiff’s case before defendant’s
case”. Instead the judge is encouraged to range over the entire case and
concentrate the inquiry on those issues most likely to result in an
expeditious disposal of the matter. While the court can only call
witnesses nominated by the parties, it does exercise discretion as to the
order and number of the witnesses and plays a vigorous role in acting as
the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses.
John Langbein’s attack on American civil procedure and his praise
for the German counterpart have stirred up a lively debate in this
country.28 Some critics accept that strengthening the court’s role in the
evidentiary process would save time and money, reduce the
wastefulness and complexity of pre‐trial and trial procedure, and cut
down on the distortions inherent in the system of partisan preparation
and production of witnesses and experts.29 They argue, nevertheless,
that such a move would be incompatible with the traditional roles of
lawyers and judges in this country and fly in the face of significant and
ineradicable features of American legal culture.30 On the one hand, John
Langbein has rightly admonished us not “to allow the cry of ‘cultural
differences’ to become the universal apologetic that permanently
sheathes the status quo against criticism based upon comparative
example.”31 On the other hand, cultural differences do explain some‐
thing of why institutional and procedural differences arise in different
legal systems and why transplanting legal institutions from one society
to another may be more difficult in one case than in another. The
important question is what weight to attach to this factor for present
purposes. John Langbein’s answer is: “Not much.”32

27. Id. at 727.
28. See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation,
85 Mich. L. Rev. 734 (1987); Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 26. See also
Langbein’s reply: John Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. Rev. 763
(1988) and the rebuttal: Ronald Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. Rev. 785 (1988). For a thoughtful critical reaction to Langbein’s
article, see John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987 (1990). I found this article most helpful for the following
discussion, although perhaps not always in a direction that John Reitz would have preferred.
29. Gross, supra note 28, at 752–56.
30. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Process and National Culture, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L.
1, 7-9 (1997).
31. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 855; see also John Langbein,
Cultural Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 41 (1997) [hereinafter
Cultural Chauvinism].
32. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 48–49.
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But this is surely a point on which reasonable people may differ.
The possibility of transplanting legal institutions is indeed one of the
most controversial topics of comparative law.33 It is also a topic much
ventilated these days in Europe. We are currently embarking in Europe
on a process of unifying the contract law of the Member States.34
Although work on a Uniform European Code of Contract Law has not yet
received the official blessing of the European Commission, the academic
debate on what is surely the largest current comparative law enterprise
in Europe is intense. In this debate, a small but articulate minority holds
the view that each of the European nations is the product of a unique
legal, political, and social history and that each nation’s social and
political values and goals are so different that the unification of law in
Europe, like the merger of the French, English and German languages, is a
barren and pointless exercise and indeed a chimera.35
I do not share this view. There is today what Oliver Wendell Holmes
might have called a far‐reaching free trade in legal ideas in all that relates
to economic activity, trade and transport, banking, and insurance. In
these fields, the possibility of transplanting legal institutions and indeed
of unifying the law should not be ruled out at the start because of
supposed cross‐cultural differences. However, we are concerned here not
with business‐related fields of substantive law, but with procedure.
There is much to be said for the view that all rules organizing constitu‐
tional, legislative, administrative, or judicial procedures are deeply rooted
in a country’s peculiar features of history, social structure, and political
consensus and as such are more resistant to transplantation. “Procedural
law is tough law,” said Otto Kahn‐Freund. Since “all that concerns the
technique of legal practice is likely to resist change” he concluded that
“comparative law has far greater utility in substantive law than in the law
of procedure, and the attempt to use foreign models of judicial
organization and procedure may lead to frustration and may thus be a
misuse of the comparative method.”36

33. See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach To Comparative Law (2d
ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 Law Q. Rev. 79 (1976). See
also the debate between Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1974) and Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72
NW. L. Rev. 198 (1977).
34. See Law Reform Projects, European Contract Law, available at http://
www.jura.unifreiburg.de/ipr1/reform.html.
35. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Book Review, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 262 (1995); Pierre
Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 Int. & Comp. L. Q. 52 (1996);
Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (1997).
36. Kahn-Freund, supra note 33, at 20.
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Must we accept this as the last word on the matter? Another
distinguished comparative lawyer and proceduralist, Arthur von Mehren,
reached a different conclusion. While not challenging the view that a
procedural system’s general structure and principal features express
society’s social and political values and goals he nevertheless said that
“very real differences between first‐instance procedural arrangements in
the United States, on the one hand, and in France and Germany, on the
other, derive much less from differences in social or political values or in
institutional, sociological, or psychological assumptions than from the
institutional fact of the concentrated or discontinuous nature of the trial”.37
One salient characteristic of European civil procedure lies indeed in
the fact that it is wholly unfamiliar with, and knows nothing of, the idea
of a “trial” as a single, temporally continuous presentation in which all
materials are made available to the adjudicator. Instead, proceedings in a
civil action on the Continent may be described as a series of isolated
conferences before the judge, some of which may last only a few minutes,
in which written communications between the parties are exchanged and
discussed, procedural rulings are made, evidence is introduced and
testimony taken until the cause is finally ripe for adjudication.38
Procedure in the common law jurisdictions, on the other hand, has been
deeply influenced by the institution of the jury.39 Since a jury cannot be
convened, dismissed and recalled from time to time over an extended
period, a common law trial must be staged as a concentrated courtroom
drama, a continuous show, running steadily, once begun, toward its
conclusion. This in turn entails a separate pre‐trial process for the parties
enabling them not only to gather the evidence that they may need at trial
but also to prevent surprise by informing themselves of the details of all
positions the opponent may advance when the controversy is ultimately
presented to the court. This solution requires elaborate pre‐trial inter‐
rogatory and discovery procedures because once the trial commences,
there is no opportunity to go back, search for further information, and
present it to the court at some later date.40
Clearly, elaborate pre‐trial probing of the arguments of fact and law
on which the other party proposes to rely provides a solution to the
surprise problem. However, this solution is not without its cost. First, it is
intrinsically duplicative. Witnesses are prepared, examined, and cross‐
37. Arthur von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in: 2 Europäisches Rechtsdenken In
Geschichteund Gegenwart, Festschrift Für Helmut Coing 361, 362 (München 1982).
38. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 42–44.
39. Reitz, supra note 28.
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examined during pre‐trial, then prepared, examined, and cross‐examined
again at trial. Second, it tends to be overbroad. Only rarely can a litigator
tell at the beginning precisely what issues and what facts will prove
important in the end. Since the judge customarily has little contact with
pre‐trial investigation, he has no opportunity to signal what information
he thinks relevant to his decision. As a result, litigators must strain to
investigate and analyse everything that could possibly arise at trial. They
tend to leave no stone unturned, provided, of course, as is often the case,
that they can charge their fees by the stone. Because of their active role in
the pre‐trial phase, lawyers typically have a greater understanding of the
case than does the judge when the controversy is presented at the trial. It
follows that lawyers run the show at trial and that they frame the issues,
question the witnesses, and stage and present even uncontroversial facts
as if in a drama. Since the judge comes to the trial with little more
understanding of the controversy than he can have from the complaint
and other documents filed with the court, he is hardly in a position to act
as the examiner‐in‐chief of the witnesses and to confine the scope of the
evidentiary process to those avenues of inquiry he thinks are relevant or
most likely to resolve the dispute.
It would seem therefore that the institution of the jury is the cause
of the strict segmentation of American procedure into pre‐trial and trial
compartments, and that this segmentation in turn is the cause for the
waste and duplication of lawyer‐dominated pre‐trial discovery
procedures. Strengthening the court’s control over the evidentiary
process would then be practicable only if the United States followed the
example of most, if not all, major common law jurisdictions and abolished
the civil jury. In England, trial by jury has almost disappeared from civil
litigation except where a person’s reputation is at stake, for example
where he sues for libel,41 and the civil jury has also withered to
insignificance in Canada42 and Australia,43 not because of dissatisfaction
with its results, but because of the costs and inefficiencies imposed by it
on the civil litigation process. Clearly, abandoning the civil jury or
restricting its availability would be a most controversial matter in the
United States. Not only is the right to trial by jury enshrined in the
Seventh Amendment and in comparable state constitutional guarantees,

41. See generally Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little
Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7
(Spring 1999).
42. See William A. Bogart, Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic: The Civil Jury in
Canada, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 305 (Spring 1999).
43. See Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 Loy.
L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 769, 775–76 (1995).
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there is also a substantial body of opinion that both the criminal and the
civil jury are worthwhile bulwarks against biased, eccentric or
incompetent trial judges and enable the public to take an active part in
the administration of both civil and criminal justice.44
I do not think, however, that the civil jury is the only or even major
villain of the piece. True, it is because of the jury that the trial must be
carried out as a single‐episode courtroom drama, and it is because of the
trial as a concentrated event that pre‐trial discovery procedures are
needed to handle the surprise problem. But it seems to me that discovery
in the form practised today in the United States goes far beyond the mere
prevention of courtroom ambush. Rather, discovery allows a party to
search and indeed “fish” for information in opponent’s and non‐parties’
hands under a very liberal standard of relevancy requiring only that the
search be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”45 It has been said that it is possible and by no means rare in
the United States for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit in order to discover
whether he might actually have one. Aggressive discovery in the
American style is unknown not only in Continental procedure, but also in
English procedure as well. Of course, all procedural systems must
balance the importance of truth for the fact‐finding process against the
need to protect areas of business and personal privacy from
unreasonable invasion. But not all systems will strike the same balance
between the two goals. It is evident that the breadth of American
discovery rules comes down more heavily on the side of privacy in civil
litigation. Judge Rifkind had a point when he said that “[a] foreigner
watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect
that this country has a highly‐prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment.”46
Nonetheless, I think an argument can be made for American
discovery methods despite the excesses to which they are prone.
Consider the type of case in which full‐dress discovery proceedings will
normally take place. In many of those cases the lawsuit is not only a
dispute between private individuals about private rights, but also a
grievance about the operation of public policy or the vindication of the
public interest. In his famous book Democracy in America, Alexis de
Tocqueville noted that “scarcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial

44. Id. at 996-97.
45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
46. Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107
(1976), quoted in Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 845.
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question.”47 This observation seems to have lost none of its pertinence
today. If a European lawyer looks at the contemporary legal scene in the
United States, he is impressed by the extent to which court litigation,
rather than legislation and administrative action, is used as a means to
cure defects in the structures and practises of important social
institutions. Class actions are a good case in point.
By allowing plaintiffs to sue for the aggregated damages suffered
by many other similarly situated individuals, the class action provides
an effective means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who
individually would not have the strength to bring their opponents into
court. In this sense, class‐action plaintiffs may be viewed as private
attorneys‐general advancing and protecting substantial public
interests. The Supreme Court has described treble damages actions
under section 4 of the Clayton Act as “a vital means of enforcing the
antitrust policy of the United States”48 and it is not the SEC, but the
shareholders’ derivative suit, that the Supreme Court regarded as “the
chief regulator of corporate management.”49 What surprises the
European observer about American product liability litigation is not the
preconditions for liability, which are just as strict in Europe as in the
United States; what he finds indeed astonishing is the stupendous
volume of litigation, the size of awards made to successful claimants,
and the fact that it is not uncommon for many thousands of claims to be
bundled together and dealt with in a single trial. All developed legal
systems must ensure the safety of products in the interest of the
consumer. It would seem, however, that Americans, with their
traditional mistrust of governmental authority, rely not so much on the
initiative of administrators or public prosecutors, but rather on private
litigation as the chief regulator of corporate action in the product safety
field. If this analysis is correct, a strong case can be made for the view
that to the extent to which private litigation serves the vindication of a
public interest, the parties must be equipped with robust discovery
procedures to ferret out the truth, even at the expense of business or
personal privacy. Nor would it seem plausible to put the discovery tools
in the hands of judges or parajudicial officials, if only because discovery
conducted by a judge or magistrate would not be as thorough as
discovery conducted by the parties’ lawyers.
Civil litigation as a means of vindicating the public interest is far
less significant in Europe. Class actions for the recovery of damages

47. Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy In America 280 (1945).
48. Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
49. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949).
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suffered by hundreds or thousands of persons are unknown on the
Continent. Derivative suits by shareholders, product liability cases and
actions based on a violation of the antitrust law are not unusual, but
have attained nowhere the dimension, vigour and force that would
qualify them as significant checks on corporate behaviour.
It is much harder to argue the case for the American civil justice
system where it deals with cases in which the lawsuit is merely a dispute
between private individuals about private rights, as, for example, in an
ordinary personal injury action. True, the vast majority of all civil matters
in the United States do not result in a jury trial, and most are resolved by
settlement.50 In Germany, too, the great majority of personal injury claims
are settled rather than resolved by court decision. However, in both
systems the parties are bargaining in the shadow of the law, and the law is
very different indeed. In the United States due to the cost and number of
attorney hours spent on investigating the case and on pretrial motions,
discovery, and trial, the economic pressure to settle is intense. Moreover,
the outcome of an American jury trial is less predictable than that of a case
tried by a German judge. Let me illustrate this by looking at one important
area of the law in which the differences are indeed striking: the law
relating to the assessment of damages for personal injuries. Legal doctrine
in Germany and the United States does not differ greatly in most such
cases. Far more significant are differences in the mode of trial. Because
these cases are tried by a judge alone in Germany, and damages are
assessed by judges, who give full and detailed reasons, the calculation of
damages has become much more regularized, systematic and uniform in
Germany while the range of awards in similar cases is very much larger in
the American system of trial, almost entirely as a result of the use of juries.
Accordingly, the probable range of damages is less predictable in the
United States than in Germany. Unpredictability leads to uncertainty, and
uncertainty increases the importance of good legal representation, which
may be easily available to repeat players like insurance companies but
raises concerns about access to justice for the poor and procedural equality
of litigants with disparate economic resources.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that what is often overlooked in
the literature on comparative civil procedure is that different procedural
systems may focus on different categories of cases. The typical case at
which the German system is aimed involves a comparatively small

50. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339 (1994).
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amount of money, raises no major issue of public policy, and is merely a
dispute between private parties about private rights. In such cases it
obviously makes sense to give the judge a leading role in the examination
of witnesses and wider powers over the evidentiary process, thereby
reducing considerably the amount of lawyer effort and cost in exchange
for a modest increase in effort and activity on the part of the judge. This is
where I think the advantages and the strength of the European
procedural systems lie. If there is a desire to reform American civil
procedure so as to provide effective justice for the “little guy”, either by
making changes within the traditional system or by developing
alternative methods of dispute resolution, then the Continental
experience may well be a worthwhile object of study.
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